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                                         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 16-1229 
____________ 
 
VICKIE JOY FETTERMAN,  
Administratrix of the Estate of Natalee Kay Mibroda, a minor decedent, 
           Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WESTMORELAND COUNTY CHILDRENS BUREAU; 
WESTMORELAND COUNTY; DEANNA SUPANCIC, individually and as  
an employee of Westmoreland County Children’s Bureau; 
SHANNON HAYWOOD, individually and as a supervisor 
of Westmoreland County Children’s Bureau; CLAYTON MIBRODA;  
KAYLA JO LICHTENFELS; BETTY JO LICHTENFELS 
  
      
 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D. C. Civil Action No. 2-15-cv-00773) 
District Judge:  Honorable Terrence F. McVerry        
                 
                        
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on October 7, 2016 
 
Before:  SHWARTZ, COWEN and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Opinion filed: March 6, 2017) 
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________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
 Vicki Joy Fetterman appeals the District Court’s order dismissing her Amended 
Complaint with prejudice.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm. 
I. 
 The facts underlying this matter are complicated, and involve the tragic death of 
Fetterman’s granddaughter Natalee.  Natalee was born on December 7, 2011, six weeks 
premature and with a severe opiate addiction as a result of her mother Kayla Jo’s chronic 
drug use during pregnancy.  Because of Natalee’s addiction, the hospital sent a social 
worker to conduct a safety investigation at Kayla Jo’s residence.  The investigation 
concluded that Natalee would be at risk because Kayla Jo and Natalee’s father Clayton 
“cannot or will not control their behavior.”  Despite being advised of these findings, the 
Westmoreland County Children’s Bureau (WCCB) took no action, and Natalee was 
released into her parents’ custody on December 9, 2011.  The next day, Kayla Jo gave 
Natalee to Fetterman, although no formal legal guardianship was established.  Three days 
later on December 12, defendant Deanna Supancic visited the residence of Kayla Jo and 
Clayton in her capacity as a case worker with WCCB.  During this visit, she learned that 
Clayton was on probation, that there were previous reports of domestic violence 
                                                   
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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involving Kayla Jo and Clayton, and that Indiana County Children and Youth Services 
(ICCYS) had previously investigated Kayla Jo and Clayton about their other child, 
Caden. 
 An ICCYS case worker visited Fetterman on December 13 and instructed 
Fetterman not to return Natalee to Kayla Jo and Clayton.  The ICCYS caseworker 
expressed concern to Supancic that same day, noting that “risk may be higher if child was 
with natural parents.”  These concerns were echoed by Fetterman who called and left 
numerous messages for Supancic and her supervisor, defendant Shannon Haywood, 
expressing concern that Natalee would be at risk if returned to Kayla Jo and Clayton.  
Although Supancic did not return these calls, she made notes of these concerns in her 
files.  In addition, Natalee’s pediatrician called and spoke with both Supancic and 
Haywood and voiced his concerns about Natalee’s health and safety.  On December 15, 
2011, Supancic directed Fetterman to return Natalee to Kayla Jo and Clayton, which 
Fetterman did that evening. 
 WCCB made no efforts to check in on Natalee immediately after her return to her 
parents, despite numerous concerned calls from Fetterman.  Twelve days later, on 
December 27, Natalee died as a result of multifocal blunt force head trauma which 
resulted in subdural and bilateral hemorrhaging.  The autopsy also revealed numerous 
broken bones and other injuries. 
 Fetterman commenced the instant suit against WCCB1 on May 28, 2015, and 
                                                   
1 The original complaint also included claims against Kayla Jo and Clayton, and against 
Natalee’s other grandmother.  Those claims were subsequently remanded to state court. 
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amended her complaint to add Haywood, Supancic, and the County as defendants on 
September 10, 2015.  On January 6, 2016, upon the defendants’ motion, the District 
Court dismissed the suit against Haywood and Supancic as untimely, and determined that 
the Supreme Court’s decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social 
Services2 precluded recovery against the County.  This appeal followed. 
II.3 
 Fetterman appeals both rulings of the District Court, arguing that the Amended 
Complaint “relates back” to the original complaint under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and that DeShaney is not controlling here because WCCB’s conduct 
constituted a “state-created danger.”  Both arguments are addressed below. 
A. 
 We first address whether the District Court erred in finding the Amended 
Complaint untimely with respect to Supancic and Haywood.  In Pennsylvania, the statute 
of limitations for claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is two years, which begins 
running when the plaintiff suffers an injury.4  In order to add new parties to a timely 
commenced action outside of this limitations period, an amended pleading must “relate 
back” to the original pleading under Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5  
An amended pleading that adds a new party “relates back” where, among other 
                                                   
2 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 
1367.  We have jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review de 
novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).  Mandel v. M & 
Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 163 (3d Cir. 2013). 
4 Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009). 
5 Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 196, 207 (3d Cir. 2006) 
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requirements, “the party to be brought in by amendment . . . knew or should have known 
that the action would have been brought against it, ‘but for a mistake concerning the 
proper party’s identity.’”6 
 The core of Rule 15’s relation back inquiry is “what the prospective defendant 
knew or should have known” after the initial pleading was filed.7  Thus, where a plaintiff 
“plainly indicate[s] such a misunderstanding [as to the newly added defendant’s identity 
or role],” an amended pleading may relate back for statute of limitations purposes.8  On 
the other hand, a plaintiff who “mak[es] a deliberate choice to sue one party instead of 
another while fully understanding the factual and legal differences between the two 
parties” will be barred from asserting her claims against the new defendant.9 
 Here, the District Court found that the Amended Complaint did not adequately 
relate back under Rule 15 with respect to defendants Supancic and Haywood.  
Specifically, it noted that Fetterman’s original complaint alleged substantially all of 
Supancic and Haywood’s conduct, yet failed to include them as defendants.  In the 
absence of any evidence that Fetterman made a mistake as to the legal or factual 
circumstances surrounding Supancic and Haywood’s involvement in Natalee’s death, the 
District Court drew the reasonable inference that Fetterman made the conscious decision 
to only sue WCCB.   
                                                   
6 Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)) (emphasis added). 
7 Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A., 560 U.S. 538, 548 (2010) (emphasis in original). 
8 Id. at 555. 
9 Id. at 549; accord Garvin v. City of Philadelphia, 354 F.3d 215, 221-22 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(“Of course, an amended complaint will not relate back if the plaintiff had been aware of 
the identity of the newly named parties when she filed her original complaint and simply 
chose not to sue them at that time.”). 
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 Fetterman argues on appeal that she made no such deliberate choice, but alleges no 
facts indicating that the failure to include Supancic and Haywood in the initial complaint 
was the result of a mistake as to identity.  In the continued absence of any evidence that 
Fetterman was operating under a mistaken factual or legal premise at the time she filed 
the initial complaint, we will affirm the District Court’s finding that the Amended 
Complaint does not relate back with respect to Supancic and Haywood.10 
B. 
 We turn next to whether the District Court erred in treating DeShaney v. 
Winnebago County Department of Social Services as controlling.  In DeShaney, the 
mother of a child who was repeatedly abused by his father for years brought suit against 
the municipal social services agency, alleging that the municipality’s failure to respond to 
numerous reports of abuse from neighbors, family members, and doctors violated the 
child’s due process rights.  In rejecting the mother’s claims, the Supreme Court held that, 
as a general matter, the Fourteenth Amendment imposes no affirmative obligation on 
states to intervene to protect private citizens from private violence.11  A narrow exception 
to this general rule does exist, however, under the “state-created danger” theory, which 
allows a claim to proceed “when the state acts in a way that makes a person substantially 
                                                   
10 Fetterman dedicates a large portion of her briefing to the question of whether Supancic 
and Haywood had constructive notice of the initial complaint.  However, the question of 
notice is entirely separate from that of whether the failure to include a party was the result 
of a mistake.  See Arthur, 434 F.3d at 207 (noting that the “notice” and “mistake” 
requirements are separate for Rule 15 purposes).  Because we affirm the District Court’s 
analysis as to the “mistake” element, we need not determine whether any of Fetterman’s 
arguments about notice have merit. 
11 489 U.S. at 196-97. 
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more vulnerable to injury from another source than he or she would have been in the 
absence of the state intervention.”12  To make out a case for such liability, a plaintiff must 
establish:  (1) the harm suffered was foreseeable and fairly direct, (2) a state actor acted 
with a degree of culpability that “shocks the conscience”, (3) the existence of a special 
relationship between the state and the victim, and (4) the affirmative use of authority in a 
way that created the danger or made the victim more vulnerable to danger.13 
 The District Court found no meaningful distinction between the instant case and 
DeShaney, holding that Fetterman had failed to allege any affirmative exercise of 
authority by WCCB or the County which “shocks the conscience.”  We agree.  Fetterman 
alleges that WCCB and the County failed to respond to numerous complaints and reports 
explaining the danger that Natalee faced with her parents.  Fetterman also alleges that 
Supancic affirmatively ordered Fetterman to return Natalee to her parents.  These actions 
clearly do not shock the conscience; indeed, they do not even rise to the level of the 
municipality’s conduct in DeShaney, which the Supreme Court characterized as merely 
negligent.14  In DeShaney, the county ignored numerous reports of actual abuse—
compared to the mere risk of abuse at issue here—and affirmatively exercised its 
authority to return the child to his abusive father even after a court order for the child’s 
removal from the home.  In the absence of more egregious conduct on the part of the 
County or WCCB, we will affirm the District Court’s determination that DeShaney is 
                                                   
12 Schieber v. City of Philadelphia, 320 F.3d 409, 416 (3d Cir. 2003). 
13 Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty., 443 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 2006). 
14 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203 (“The most that can be said of the state functionaries in this 
case is that they stood by and did nothing when suspicious circumstances dictated a more 
active role for them.”). 
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controlling and that the state-created danger exception does not apply. 
III. 
 While we are sympathetic to the horrible circumstances surrounding Fetterman’s 
loss, we are not free to ignore clear, binding precedent from the Supreme Court of the 
United States even in such emotionally charged cases.  Because we find that the District 
Court correctly applied Rule 15 to dismiss defendants Supancic and Haywood, and 
properly treated DeShaney as controlling to dismiss WCCB and the County, we will 
affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
